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List of Abbreviations 
 
• LGS                    Lietuvos gydytojų sąjunga 
• LFDPS                Lietuvos farmacijos darbuotojų profesinė sąjunga 
• LSSO                  Lietuvos slaugos specialistų organizacija 
• LSADPS             Lietuvos sveikatos apsaugos darbuotojų profesinė sąjunga 
• LMS                    Lietuvos medikų sąjūdis 
• LŠPS                   Lietuvos švietimo profesinė sąjunga 
• LŠĮPSP                Lietuvos švietimo įstaigų profesinė sąjunga 
• LMPSP                Lietuvos mokytojų profesinė sąjunga 
• LAMPSS             Lietuvos aukštųjų mokyklų profesinių sąjungų susivienjimas 
• LŠDPS                Lietuvos švietimo darbuotojų profesinė sąjunga 
• LŠMPS                Lietuvos švietimo ir mokslo profesinė sąjunga 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Since the end of the Cold War industrial relations (IR) in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), on 
top of inherited ideological-institutional legacies from the Soviet era, have undergone significant 
structural changes that are widely believed to have diminished organized labor’s power and 
significance. According to the leading political economy and IR approaches, the pattern is the most 
pronounced in what are referred as neoliberal Baltic states, featuring among the weakest labor 
movements across CEE that are resembled in lagging behind IR regimes institutionalization, trade 
union density and collective bargaining coverage. However, when we turn our focus to the public 
sector explicitly, the manner and degree in which IR regimes have changed across CEE varies in 
ways that stand in tension with broad widely accepted labels, leading to mistaken ideas. 
To prove the inconsistency of the exaggerated regional patterns and typologization, Lithuania is 
a case in point. Against its allegedly neoliberal backdrop, public sector trade unions from 
healthcare and to a lesser degree education sub-sectors in the past few years managed to obtain 
considerable concessions to the workers they represent. Cases of education and healthcare are 
interesting not only for defying the odds of generally unfavorable soil for labor movements to be 
viable, but also for the variance in outcomes the organized labor from the two sub-sectors managed 
to obtain.  
While the relatively superior performance of public sector labor movement can in part be 
explained with higher degree of protection from market pressures, less elastic labor market and 
structural peculiarities of employment, knowing this, only untangles the external conditions upon 
which the capacity of trade unions is embedded and tells us half of the story for the successes and 
failures in trade union performance. Accordingly, in order to untangle the internal dimension for 
public sector trade union capacity in Lithuania, research will employ Power Resource Theory 
(PRT) addressing the following question: why in the past few years have public healthcare 
labor movement fared better in terms of outcomes from collective bargaining process 
compared to education trade unions?  
Focusing on public sector industrial relations explicitly while examining the causes for the trade 
union successes and failures has implications not only for a more nuanced comprehension of CEE 
IR regimes in the face of widely accepted regional patterns which appears to be lacking from the 
existing research, but also for IR stakeholders, including workers, and is of particular interest for 
efforts aimed at improving IR regimes efficacy. In the absence of a nuanced account, features and 
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sources of variance in the bargaining power of unions in CEE are easily misunderstood and can 
contribute to a misunderstanding of trends in the region and within countries. 
In order to answer the research question, I will first provide an overview of CEE IR background 
and leading approaches that debate its development and occurring regional patterns. Then, I will 
introduce public sector IR data that is incongruent with the leading approaches and touch upon 
recent developments in Lithuania’s public sector IR. Chapter 3 will discuss the theoretical 
implications for public sector relative preeminence and test how Lithuania’s case fits them. Then, 
I will proceed with the occurring puzzle and elaborate on the selection of Power Resource Theory 
(PRT) as a theoretical framework to explain the variance in outcomes between the two sub-sectors. 
Chapter 4 will set out a method to test the proposed hypothesis. Chapter 5 will provide a case study 
of each sub-sector and then will proceed with the comparison of causes for the successes and 
failures in performance of labor movements. Chapter 6 will conclude the research and discuss the 
implications of the results for Lithuania’s and CEE IR.  
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Chapter 2: Context and Leading Approaches of CEE IR 
 
2.1 Institutional and Ideological Legacies 
There is a general scholarly consensus, with a notable exception of Slovenia, about 
underdeveloped IR in Lithuania and the rest of the CEE. While some authors originate the general 
weaknesses of IR systems from institutional and ideological legacies from the Soviet era and 
largely see CEE as a more or less uniform unit (Ost, 2000; Crowley, 2004), others tend to be more 
delicate regarding the generalization and emphasize the sub-regional divergence in political 
economies that also differently conditioned the development of IR regimes (Feldmann, 2006; 
Bohle & Greskovits, 2012). 
Regarding the first grouping of authors, after the Cold War as a rule the largest and the most 
influential trade unions in CEE were inherited from a fundamentally different political economy 
where the establishment of them served a substantially different purpose. Institutionally, during 
the Soviet times, trade unions were allies of the management, encouraged increased production 
and to some extent facilitated social welfare provision (Crowley, 2004). Accordingly, under the 
market economy conditions trade unions generally failed to fathom their shifted political and social 
role, thus falling through in proving their instrumentality to workers (See Kallaste, Woolfson; 
2009). Ideologically, as post-socialist/communist CEE societies largely stigmatized Soviet 
legacies or institutions and viewed them as not complementary to capitalist development and 
integration with the West, trade unions were unsure whether to defend the workers from capitalism 
or help to embrace it. Therefore, trade unions were facing a dilemma: on one hand, taking an over 
anti-capitalist stance, they would risk to jeopardize their already weak support from the society 
even more; on the other hand, helping to bring capitalism about would go against their purpose 
and operational goals, such as: “delivering concessions like higher wages, job security, better work 
conditions, and limiting the managerial authority” (Crowley, 2004). 
 
2.2 Varieties of IR Regimes in CEE 
Although the institutional and ideological legacies significantly aggravated the development of IR 
across CEE, other strand of literature argues that the situation is not uniform and underlines 
different post-transitional political economy development trajectories that also caused a variance 
in degree of the state of IR regimes in the region. 
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Notable attempts to decompose the region into different units for analysis were inspired by Hall 
and Soskice (2001) Varieties of Capitalism approach (Feldmann, 2006; Buchen, 2007; Adam, et. 
al.; 2009).  As of widely known, institutional arrangements within advanced capitalist regimes 
significantly differ across the world. Yet, they can be grouped into two main categories: Liberal 
market economy (LME) or Coordinated market economy (CME). Obviously, the more features of 
CME ideal type a country possess, the more favorable the conditions for IR development and vice 
versa. This approach is applicable to a certain degree to CEE likewise. It is evident empirically 
from two of the CEE political economy antipodes — Baltic States and Slovenia. While Baltic 
States meet the LME criteria the most and consequently feature significantly weaker and 
decentralized organized labor’s position which is resembled in overall the lowest across the region 
trade union density and collective bargaining coverage, Slovenia is categorized as a CME and 
features the most developed IR system similar to Western European neocorporatist state model 
(See table 1).  
However, the LME and CME dichotomy is binary. Even though it allows to categorize two 
extreme cases within CEE, such as Baltic States and Slovenia, it overlooks the peculiarity of more 
intertwined and fuzzy economies in Visegrad sub-region that do not easily map on the bimodal 
type. Interestingly, Visegrad states feature in overall higher trade union densities and significantly 
higher collective bargaining coverage compared to Baltic States, but still lag behind Slovenia 
which calls for alternative frameworks to grasp the CEE IR.  
Table 1. Collective bargaining coverage and trade union density in CEE (excl. Romania). 
Data source: International Labor Organization (ILO). Time range: 2014-2016 
Country Trade union density (%) Collective bargaining 
coverage (%) 
Bulgaria 13.7 10.8 
Czech Republic 12 46.3 
Estonia 4.5 18.6 
Hungary 8.5 22.8 
Latvia 12.6 13.8 
Lithuania 7.7 7.1 
Poland 12.1 17.2 
Slovak Republic 11.2 24.4 
Slovenia 26.9 70.9 
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2.3 Transnational Capitalism and Trimodal Trajectory 
To make more sense out of the haziness of CEE blackbox, inspired by Polanyi’s The Great 
Transformation, Bohle & Greskovits (2007; 2012) proposed a more comprehensive way to 
understand the diversity of CEE political economies and IR regimes. According to this approach, 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, independent CEE states have found different, but patterned 
solutions to the Polanyi‘s proposed trinity of fundamental conflicts between: “market efficiency, 
social cohesion, political legitimacy” (Bohle & Greskovits, 2012). The patterned transformational 
divergence resulted in distinctive features post-socialist/communist CEE regimes have developed 
that can be grouped into three main units according to their similarity. First, Baltic states and to 
some extent Romania and Bulgaria, feature relatively prevalent market radicalism combined with 
obscure domestic compensation for occurring adjustment costs and general exclusion of its citizens 
and organized social groups from policy formation or making, thus captured as a neoliberal block. 
Second, Visegrad states are characterized as an intermediate case, featuring constant mediation 
between market efficiency and social cohesion that result in more egalitarian, but not necessarily 
quality democratic governments, therefore, referred as embedded neoliberal block. Third, Slovenia 
features the most inclusive, egalitarian and the least radical in terms of market efficiency stance. 
Accordingly, it is prescribed to the neocorporatist model.  
 In similar vein to the Varieties of Capitalism approach, the capacity of trade unions is 
embedded in their external conditions that are largely determined by the type of capitalism and 
institutional environment they operate in (See Table 1; Kahancova, 2015). Although even the 
neocorporatist or embedded liberal block over the years experienced significant neoliberalization, 
the angles of the trajectory are varied and not as profound as in the neoliberal block. This 
framework generally explains of a more frequent instance of stronger trade unions and higher 
institutional support for more substantiated outcomes from collective bargaining in embedded 
neoliberal or neocorporatist, compared to neoliberal block. 
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Table 2. Preconditions for the variation in trade union capacity and action across CEE 
(Kahancova, 2015). 
Labor Mobilization 
  Low High 
Institutionalization 
of bargaining 
High CZ, HU, PL, SK (Visegrad 
– embedded liberal block) 
SI (neocorporatist 
block) 
 Low EE, LV, LT (Baltic States 
– neoliberal block) 
BG, RO (neoliberal 
block) 
 
2.4 Public sector IR incongruence with the leading frameworks 
As we turn our viewpoint from the national level dynamics to the public sector explicitly, alleged 
IR regional differences that stem from sub-regional trimodal trajectories, do not transpire to the 
proposed labelling as accurately. Interestingly, public sector labor movements in what are referred 
as neoliberal states in some respects even surpass those in Visegrad block.  
First, although the institutionalization is a broadly applied term that can mean either the 
involvement of labor in a decision-making process or just a legal base that sets the limits for 
industrial activity, such as rights for association, bargaining and strike, public sector IR in CEE do 
not correspond to the proposed tri-modal categorization at least in one aspect of it. While there is 
no aggregate statistical data that distinguishes between public and private sectors in terms of labor 
involvement, legal limits for industrial activity raise suspicion to the proposed variance in 
institutionalization levels (See Table 2). Poland features the strictest legal regulation for public 
sector trade unions, while in Lithuania and Slovenia labor movements have the most favorable 
legal basis to act. On top of that, neoliberal Estonia in this account surpass embedded neoliberal 
Slovak Republic and Hungary (Visser, 2019).  
Second, despite unavailable data regarding the collective bargaining coverage rates between 
the two sectors in CEE, trade union densities cast additional doubt to the widely accepted labels.  
The arrangement of countries according to their trade union density rates in public sector 
considerably differ from private sector or national level densities. For example, Latvia’s private 
sector trade union density is 5.6 %, while in public sector it stands at 32 %. Interestingly, while 
private sector labor in neoliberal CEE states tends to be the least unionized, public sector 
unionization rates even surpass those in embedded liberal block (See Chart 1). It suggests that even 
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if the private sector’s labor is pressured more heavily by neoliberal state approach in neoliberal 
block, it does not transpire to the public sector as much. 
 
 
Third, although one could argue that neoliberal economic regime would mean more state 
retrenchment to public services provision in neoliberal than in embedded liberal or neocorporatist 
states, the differences and their effects to the public sector IR systems are ambiguous. While 
Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania share the lowest public expenditure rates, Estonia and Latvia are 
more similar to Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland in this regard (Eurostat, 2018). In addition, 
lower public expenditure has a twofold effect to the public sector industrial relations: on one hand, 
higher fiscal constraints negatively affect employer attitudes towards labor demands to reach a 
compromise; on the other hand, fiscal constraints and negative employer attitudes ignite a higher 
discontent from the labor, thus resulting in more militant action and heavy pressure towards the 
employer. Accordingly, as observed by Kahancova (2015), more severe labor backlash strategy 
can work similarly well in comparison to cooperative approach in gaining concessions which 
means that significantly more mobilized public sector trade unions in neoliberal block can 
compensate for the alleged lack of institutionalization through instigation of political pressure. 
Literature provides worthy empirical examples in CEE regarding the argument. While most of 
the governments in CEE during the post global financial crisis period undertook considerable 
austerity measures that cut the financing for public services provision, generally stronger public 
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sector labor movements in terms of mobilization, strayed away from traditional institutionalized 
bargaining channels and employed more adversarial strategies that materialized in certain 
reversion of deterioration of employment conditions (Bernaciak, et. al. 2011; Kahancova & Szabo, 
2012). Although the pattern is more pronounced in embedded neoliberal block, there is a mounting 
evidence from neoliberal states likewise (Adăscăliței & Muntean, 2019; Boganoski et. Al., 2014). 
Consequently, as seen from various dimensions that make up the viability and role of trade 
unions within IR regimes, we should not take national IR contexts for granted as widely accepted 
sub-regional differences considerably lose their weight in public sector.  
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Chapter 3: Causes for the developments in Lithuania’s public sector 
IR and occurring puzzle  
 
3.1 Public Sector IR Developments in Lithuania 
In the previous chapter stated insights regarding the public sector IR incongruence with the leading 
approaches start to make even more sense when we consider public sector IR historical patterns 
and recent developments in Lithuania. Historically, though with the less substantive outcomes, 
most of the industrial activity revolved around public sector. According to the Department of 
Statistics of Lithuania (2019), since the year 2000, when statistical data of strikes has been started 
to be collected, until the end of 2018, 1,370 strikes were organized. Interestingly, almost all of the 
strikes were organized by the public sector workers. 
Taking a look at all of the collective agreements that, by the time of writing, are legally binding 
and registered in the registry of Ministry of Social Security (2020), similar conclusions about 
asymmetrical intensity in industrial relations between private and public sectors can be drawn (See 
Chart 2). By quasi-public I refer to privatized, but largely public owned enterprises.  The figures 
become even more significant when one takes into consideration the fact that public sector workers 
comprise 22,8 % of all active employees in Lithuania (OECD, 2017).  
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Moreover, despite more or less ambiguous developments in national tripartite collective 
bargaining historically and recently, sectoral collective agreements in education and healthcare 
sub-sectors in the past few years featured relatively considerable improvements in working 
conditions and wage increases for workers (Woolfson & Kallaste, 2009; Mundeikis, 2018; 
Eurofound, 2017). 
Public education labor movement with the Ministry of Education and Sports in November 
2017 signed a collective agreement that foreseen the implementation of a new wage-setting method 
which involved a more equitable wage determination for teachers. In addition, the government 
pledged to appoint additional 93 mln. EUR for wage increases under a new wage-setting system 
in the next two years. Although the enforcement of the new system led to some unintended 
negative externalities that were not thoroughly discussed beforehand, over the course of two years, 
education labor movement managed to amend some of the unsatisfactory aspects of the new 
system and additionally increased the financing for pre-school and pre-elementary teaching staff 
and higher education workers’ wages. 
Meanwhile public healthcare labor movement over the course of roughly 2 years with the 
Ministry of Healthcare signed two collective agreements that also included some significant 
amendments. As a result, public healthcare workers experienced an unprecedented increase in 
wages and other improvements in employment conditions, such as additional vacation days, 
implementation of universal wage floor for medical personnel and significant social and economic 
incitements for resident doctor staff (SAM, 2018). 
However, besides other improvements in employment conditions, as seen from the Chart 3, 
public education wage increases significantly lagged behind the healthcare rise in wages. Although 
over the course of 2 years public education wages began to close the gap with the average country 
wage level, wages for healthcare workers experienced an unprecedented rise and further widened 
the previously existed gap either between the country or education sector average wage levels. 
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The occurring disparities not only raise questions why public sector organized labor is more 
preeminent and shows a tendency to be significantly less affected by national political economy 
and IR contexts, but also why the successes between its sub-sectors vary considerably in substance.  
 
3.2 Theoretical Implications for Public Sector IR Preeminence 
To explain the public sector IR preeminence, literature propose various explanations. Although 
there seem to be a range of variables that affect the gap between the two sectors, three main 
groupings of explanations gather the most attention. 
Most notably, market constraints in an ever globalizing and competitive market more 
negatively affect private sector’s labor leverage and bargaining power compared to public sector. 
Private sector most frequently consists of enterprises that are exposed to international market 
forces that pressure the overall prices of goods and services to converge. If firms in this sector 
raise their output price, they risk to lose competitiveness or employment (Traxler & Brandl, 2012). 
However, non-trading sector (i.e. public sector), which is sheltered from international competition 
is able to externalize the output prices in parallel with surging wages (Garrett & Way, 1999).  
0
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Moreover, in relation to market constraints, public sector workers reinforce their leverage 
through the inelasticity of demand for their labor (Katz, et. al. 2015). Alternative sources for public 
sector services or production are much more difficult to come by. Drawing from Alfred Marshall’s 
conditions, first, public employers are facing much higher obstacles in substituting their employees 
through automation of production process than in private sector. Second, the elasticity of final 
goods is much greater in private sector. It means that public sector has an advantage, because most 
often it is the sole provider of specific services or production. Public sector services/production 
most often cannot simply go out of business and be substituted by the competitors in a short term. 
Other strand of the literature emphasizes structural peculiarities of public employment that 
generate a higher need for union representation. Homogenous character of terms and conditions in 
public employment make individual bargaining less likely to be viable. Therefore, public workers 
have a higher necessity to gain improvements in wages or working conditions through collective 
action and union representation (Bordogna & Pedersini, 2013). In addition, trade union 
representation is substantially more segmented in public sector. It is reflected in relatively strong 
professional groups and identities. 
Lastly, public-private industrial relations gap may be a subject to employers’ attitudes to labor 
movement that seem to differ between the two sectors. Although public sector is much more 
affected than private sector by political pressures, public demands or fiscal constraints, in practice, 
public employers tend to follow the letter of the law better (Katz, et. al. 2015). Accordingly, public 
employees are more sheltered from the possibility to encounter negative attitudes concerning union 
affiliation from their employers that may undermine their career prospects (Bordogna & Pedersini, 
2013). Relatively lower management opposition to public workers can be associated with now 
generally more relaxed legal environment regarding the rights for association, collective 
bargaining and strikes, compared to strict regulatory limitations in the past (Freeman, 1988; 
Kearney & Mareschal, 2014). Most usually it is in government’s own interest to maintain overall 
employment levels and wages, especially during the economic downturn as a form of vote-seeking 
behavior. Moreover, public sector unions, especially in the sectoral bargaining pose a significantly 
higher threat to government’s legitimacy (Traxler, Brandl, 2010). 
 
  
16 
 3.3 Framing Lithuania’s Case into The General Theoretical Propositions 
To put these theoretical considerations into the context of Lithuania, evidence from already 
existing researches provide sufficient proof for the unionization gap. Due to meticulously 
implemented Washington Consensus neoliberal policies in the early 1990s, as mentioned 
previously, Lithuania most generally is prescribed to neoliberal political economy type (Norkus, 
2008; Bohle & Greskovits, 2007a, 2007b, 2012). Unlike to other CEE states, such as Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Poland or Slovenia whose post-socialist economic integration and 
development relied on dependent industrialization from the West, Baltic states were subject to 
dependent financialization. These circumstances did not allow for Lithuania to significantly 
transform and renew its industrial base (Berniacak, 2015). As a consequence, Lithuanian 
enterprises mainly export raw materials or traditional industrial goods that can be prescribed to the 
lowest value-added production segment (Bohle, 2008; Greskovits, 2005). These settings generate 
uneven dynamics in the industrial relations that make the probability of compromise between 
capital and labor in private sector less likely for largely three reasons: 1) internationalization of 
markets with monetary conservatism; (2) high share of labor costs in the production process; (3) 
Low sunk-costs into the production infrastructure (Norkus, 2008). 
Accordingly, private sector was much more significantly affected by neoliberal orthodoxy than 
public sector, which resulted in labor market dualization into primary and secondary markets 
(Juska & Woolfson,  2015). Primary market turned out to mostly consist of self-regenerating public 
employment, while most of the private sector employment largely featured low-skill and low-wage 
employment. In addition, public sector employment features higher levels of social protection and 
benefits compared to secondary employment segment. The labor market bifurcation increased 
private sector’s employment precariousness which limited labor’s ability to oppose the capital. As 
a result, since Lithuania joined the EU in 2004, exit to Western/Northern European states as a more 
formidable option to significant number of workers followed. 
Although labor exodus abroad since Lithuania joined the EU would suggest about improved 
labor’s that remained in the country leverage to raise their voice collectively, in reality, emigration 
positively altered the situation of an average skilled worker through the creation of more favorable 
conditions to his/her’s power to negotiate wages on an individual basis. This materialised in the 
significant salary increases of the years prior to the recession in 2007–2009 (Sippola, 2017). It is 
also important to mention that the post-crisis period was marked by a skyrocketing growth of 
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shadow economy, which, regarding the labor market, explicitly consists of private sector activities 
and full or partially illegal employment (Žukauskas, 2013). Obviously, organized interest 
representation is hardly feasible while operating in informal working environment. 
On the other hand, Blažienė et., al. (2019) argued that both private and public sectors suffer 
from the relatively low trade union density rates that lead to generally low spread of collective 
bargaining and collective agreements for different reasons. In public sector, significant number of 
employment and working conditions, including remuneration issues, are strictly regulated by 
national legislation, leaving little room for manoeuvre in collective bargaining. In addition, the 
state role of participating in collective bargaining has been somewhat ambiguous. 
In private sector employers tend to be reluctant to take the role as social partners. Furthermore, 
private sector mainly comprises small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), which generally 
lowers the need for collective interest representation and does not go in hand with Lithuania’s 
labor code that does not allow for union representation in enterprises with less than 20 employees 
(Blažienė et., al., 2019). Moreover, there seems to be incongruence of labor vs employer 
organizations in private sector (Blažienė et. al., 2019). 
Lastly, according to Kalanta (2019), as Lithuania’s economic growth became led by exports in 
the post 2009 global financial crisis period, favorable price trends in the international market to 
export-exposed sector created particular circumstances upon which profits increased faster than 
labor costs. As long as this status quo remains, export-exposed businesses have a luxury to employ 
a strategy that is not complementary with social dialogue and its institutions. 
 
3.4 The Puzzle of Different Outcomes from Activity Between Healthcare and 
Education Sub-sectors 
To summarize, CEE political economies differ in their institutional arrangements and approaches 
in solving fundamental capitalism conflicts between market efficiency, social cohesion and 
political legitimacy. These varied settings undoubtedly translate into the role and capacity 
organized labor features within the regimes. Accordingly, while organized labor is the most 
organized and influential actor within the regimes that give priority to social cohesion and civic 
inclusion into the political process at the expense of market efficiency, it is the least significant 
within the regimes that do otherwise. Therefore, neoliberal market-oriented approach in Lithuania 
is one of the least favorable soils in CEE for trade unions to be viable. It is clearly visible from 
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national trade union density and collective bargaining coverage that are among the lowest across 
CEE. 
However, while the effects of Lithuania’s capitalist regime undeniably undermine private 
sector’s organized labor as observed by various authors from already existing researches, its effects 
are significantly less profound to public sector. Higher degree of protection from market pressures, 
less elastic labor market and structural peculiarities of employment do play an important role that 
make up the settings for public sector trade unions in neoliberal states to feature much more similar 
or in some respects even more superior conditions for labor organization compared to embedded 
neoliberal block. 
 This nuanced account allows to fathom more clearly the instance of a relatively substantive 
organized labor’s in public sector performance in neoliberal Lithuania. However, even though the 
cases of public healthcare and education stand as proof for the argument, the considerable disparity 
in outcomes between the two sub-sectors from the collective bargaining makes one to wonder why 
seemingly the same medium to act, that is public sector, resulted in such variance of organized 
labor achievements. IR literature in Lithuania so far not only tend to overlook different external 
conditions between the private and public sectors, but also internal dynamics for trade union 
capacity in public sector that seem to play a role in causing the variance in outcomes from 
industrial activity.  
While external public sector conditions upon which capacity of trade unions is embedded are 
more or less untangled, exploring further the question of why in the past few years have public 
healthcare organized labor fared better in terms of outcomes from the collective bargaining 
process compared to education trade unions, can deepen our understanding about internal 
dynamics of the sector itself and how certain trade unions can make more out of the generally more 
favorable circumstances than others. Focusing on this question has implications not only for 
bridging the gap regarding the literature of trade union capacity in the rest of the CEE where each 
case demonstrates varied and puzzling dynamics of public sector organized labor capacity, but also 
for IR stakeholders, including workers, and is of particular interest for efforts aimed at improving 
the efficacy of IR regime. 
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Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis 
 
In order to answer the research question — Power Resource Theory (PRT) will be applied for the 
analysis. PRT originated from the attempts to explain the expansion of welfare state in advanced 
capitalist countries in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It takes issue with the functionalist approach 
which strictly associates the emergence of welfare state with high economic development and 
points out that the prevalance of welfare policies within a state, rather depends more on the strength 
of labor movement (Olsen & O’Connor, 1998). It also disagrees with the pluralist account of power 
to which it is a a widely scattered resource across the society and to a certain degree goes in hand 
with the Marxist notion that the capitalist class is by far the most powerful actor in a given capitalist 
regime in owing to its control over the means of production. However, the balance of power 
between labor and capital, according to the PRT, rather than being absolute, is fluid, and therefore 
variable (Olsen & O’Connor, 1998). 
In a way PRT coincides with the Varieties of Capitalism or Transnational Capitalism 
approaches as they apportion the regimes considerably according to their capital vs. labor relation, 
however, PRT has wider means of application. The defined power balances between capital and 
labor within regimes in previously discussed VoC or Transnational Capitalism approaches are tied 
to their national contexts and, as observed previously, do not transpire to the public sector as much. 
Therefore, the static national level balance of power overlooks the fluidity of different capital and 
labor power balances between the two sectors of the economy.  
In accordance to this reasoning based on the PRT logic, public sector organized labor is 
embedded in more lenient power balance between capital and labor which generates more 
favorable settings for trade unions to nudge the decision-making process regarding the 
employment conditions towards its advantage from industrial activity more significantly compared 
to private sector. However, the capacity of public sector labor that is embedded in more favorable 
external settings compared to the rest of the economy is only a half of piece to the puzzle. How 
well more favorable external conditions by public sector trade unions are utilized, depends on how 
well developed are their internal power resources that lay the foundations for the success of 
particular strategies trade unions may employ.  
Although there are mainly two strategies organized labor can employ, that is adversarial 
and cooperative, the latter one in the past decade in CEE significantly lost its relevance even in 
generally more favorable external environments for industrial activity. As a rule of thumb, during 
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the post global financial crisis period, if trade unions had any success, it was largely from their 
strategies that began to mainly rely on: “their position as veto players within the system” 
(Bernaciak, 2011). Evidence from Adăscăliței & Muntean (2019) and Kaminska (2015) researches 
also support the case of a significance for success from implementation of more hostile trade union 
strategies. Accordingly, this leads to a reasonable expectation that relatively more successful 
outcomes from industrial activity in healthcare sub-sector were caused by employment of more 
effective adversarial strategy of trade unions. Though the effectiveness of employment of 
particular strategy depends on how well developed are corresponding power resources 
(Adăscăliței & Muntean, 2019). 
Drawing upon trade union capacity literature in CEE and already knowing the outcomes in 
trade union performance, we can apply a deductive epistemology to test the causal effect between 
available internal power resources, their strategic application and outcomes form collective 
bargaining in public sector in Lithuania (Trampusch & Palier, 2016). According to this reasoning, 
it is useful to state the hypothesis: relative success of healthcare organized labor was caused by 
its more developed adversarial power resources that were more effectively applied in 
corresponding strategies in collective bargaining process compared to labor movement in 
education sub-sector.   
Before diving deeper, it is essential to define what are the main adversarial power resources 
and to which strategies they are applicable. Among the adversarial power resources, three main 
components stand out: 
1. Associational power. It originates from the organization of workers as a collective 
(Adăscăliței & Muntean, 2019). It serves more of a signaling tool that increases the 
credibility of the possibility of a strike. Use of this particular power resource has relatively 
low costs for trade unions as it is largely applied to inform other negotiating parties of an 
existence of a possible strike and its scale, that is strike threats.  
2. Structural power. It is an essential power resource for trade unions which stems from the 
position of workers in the economic system and can result in immediate results to the raised 
demands by the workers. This power has two subtypes: marketplace bargaining power and 
workplace bargaining power. The first of the sub-types regards the position of workers in 
the labor market. The second one derives from how well the workers are integrated into 
the production process. The more essential workers are to the production process, the more 
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disruptive and detrimental can be the outcomes to the businesses or institution. The 
strategic use of this power resource largely involves pickets or warning strikes. 
3. Organizational power. Although associational power is a significant resource to 
consolidate the strength of the trade union and can be determined by the sheer number of 
memberships, it overlooks the importance of organized labor coordination and 
mobilization of membership. Deployment of this strategy is a costly endeavor, because in 
an instance of unorganized and uncoordinated action it can backfire when mobilization fails 
to bring the desired outcome (Adăscăliței & Muntean, 2019). According to Gumbrell-
McCormick & Hyman (2013) organizational power stems more from willingness to ‘act’, 
rather than ‘willingness to pay’ for the trade union membership and is essential to the 
success of such adversarial strategies as strikes.  
Table 3. Power resources and corresponding strategies 
Power resources (independent 
variable) 
Corresponding strategy 
(conjecturing mechanism) 
Associational                 →                Strike threats   Outcome from the 
bargaining 
(dependent variable) 
Structural                       →                Pickets and warnings strikes 
Organizational               →                Strikes 
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Chapter 5: Methodology 
 
5.1 Comparative case study, theory testing process tracing 
As the research question seeks to examine the causes for the variance in outcomes (dependent 
variable) from the collective bargaining processes in healthcare and education sub-sectors, multi-
method approach of comparative case study together with theory testing process tracing will be 
applied.  
This selection of combining two methods is largely encouraged due to unrealistic Mill’s method 
of difference requirements for causal relationship estimation between independent and dependent 
variables. Controlled comparison between the cases cannot be assured as they are almost never 
identical. Mill himself admitted that this method cannot work precisely in a presence of 
equifinality. A phenomenon when the same outcome can be caused by different combinations or 
ways of variables (Bennet, 2009).  
Although Mill’s method of difference applied in a loose manner is considerably heuristic, its 
accuracy and validity can be supplemented by historical explanation of cases or, so to say, process 
tracing. Using this method, a theory can be used at each step of a particular bargaining process to 
explain how variables made gradual steps to the ultimate outcome, thus opening the black box of 
the causality between X and Y (Bennet, 2009). However, process tracing is often used as an 
umbrella term that consists of various approaches for different purposes. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, the research already knows the independent variables, that is power resources, 
intervening mechanism – employment of corresponding strategies, and dependent variable – 
outcome from the collective bargaining process. The hypothesis hints us that a theory testing 
process tracing method would serve well in the pursuit of answering the research question.  
“In theory-testing process-tracing, we know both X and Y and we either have existing 
conjectures about a plausible mechanism or are able to use logical reasoning to formulate a 
causal mechanism from existing theorization” (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).  
 Therefore, the research will initially introduce each case separately, beginning with a brief 
description of each sector’s main worker grievances and their origins, followed by description and 
inclusion of power resources, their application to trade union strategies and interplay with the 
collective bargaining process outcomes. Then, research will proceed with the comparison of both 
cases and clarification of independent variables (power resources) connection with the dependent 
variable (outcomes from collective bargaining). 
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5.2 Operationalizing independent variables: three dimensions of adversarial power 
resources 
1. Associational power resources of trade unions will be measured by the number of their 
members. 
2. Structural power resources of trade unions will be measured through an inquiry of labor 
market demands and supply, competition between private vs. public sectors in analyzed 
sub-sectors. 
3. Organizational power resources concern the ability and capacity of trade unions to act in 
a coordinated manner. Therefore, it will be operationalized through an inquiry of the ability 
of trade unions to coordinate their actions unanimously and obediently.  
5.3 Data sources 
Main data sources for the research will be: collective bargaining protocols, collective bargaining 
agreements, interviews with the trade union members and trade union surveys, trade union 
communication channels (websites and social media), legal documents such as Lithuania’s labor 
code, media articles and video reports. Research will also use a variety of quantitative data largely 
from the Department of Statistics of Lithuania.  
 
5.4 Timeframe for the analysis  
Main timeframe for the analysis: 2017-2019 (3 years). This is due to the fact that a new labor code 
was passed and came into force in 2017. Moreover, collective agreements between the government 
and education and healthcare sectors were signed after 2017. Plus, since the new government was 
elected in 2016, this timeframe will serve to control the variable of political cycles and accordingly 
changing attitudes from employers to labor movement every four years.  
Although the main timeframe for the analysis will only be three years, research will also 
provide variety of quantititave that goes back to 2008 to contextualize the tendencies and patterns 
in power resources. 
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Chapter 6: Analysis 
 
6.1 Case study: Education 
Despite being relatively underfinanced in the context of the Baltic States regarding the 
GDP/education expenditure ratio, public education in Lithuania has not been properly optimized 
to the changing structural needs that stem from a large network of education institutions and 
generally decreasing number of students each year (Eurydice, 2018/19; Eurostat, 2018). Over the 
years there were many attempts to implement various reforms to adapt to occurring challenges, 
however, without significant success. It seems that Lithuania’s education system is under a 
constant reform that confuses and irritates both education workers and society. The main 
grievances education workers and their trade unions over the years have clearly expressed are low 
wage levels that were increasingly lagging behind the country’s average and excessive workload 
workers are obliged to deliver outside contact teaching hours preparing for classes or participating 
in various school activity programmes that are not paid for (Antavičius, 2016). Increasing 
workload is evident from the statistics showing that over a decade the number of teachers for each 
100 students had decreased from 12,1 to 11 (See Table 3). 
 
Table 4. Changes in labor force dynamics in public education. Source: Osp.stat.gov.lt 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Number of 
teachers for 100 
students 
12.1 12.1 11.7 11.2 10.9 10.8 10.9 10.8 11.1 11.1 11 
Job vacancies in 
education sector 
652 253 265 303 296 417 437 439 366 458 356 
 
Furthermore, as seen from the table above, although the demand for education workers over 
the last decade stayed relatively moderate and more or less the same, there is a growing need to 
attract new and young pedagogues now, because, according to the estimations from one trade 
union survey, in 15 years from now, around 40-50 % of teachers will retire (Eurydice, 2018/19; 
Mundeikis, 2020). Moreover, there is also a competition for the labor force from private sector 
which comprise 1/12 of all education workers (Viešojo sektoriaus tendencijos, 2019). 
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Constant dissatisfaction among the workers in the largest employment segment in public 
sector, is evident from the incidence and scale of occurring strikes. Although this is also in part of 
relatively favorable legal basis for trade union association and rights for strike compared to other 
spheres of public employment, education sub-sector is the ultimate champion in this regard, as it 
basically causes all of the strikes in the country. 
 
Table 5. Strike occurrence and scale in public education and overall number of strikes in the country. 
Source: osp.stat.gov.lt 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Education 
workers that went 
on strike (real and 
warning) 
7961 - - - 5558 - 1591 7126 6295 - 4498 
Number of 
strikes/ Education 
112 - - - 193 - 78 296 242 - 196 
Number of 
strikes/ Country 
112 - - - 193 - 78 296 242 1 196 
 
Public officials being aware of the persisting problems that were vocally expressed in 2015-
2016 strikes, in order to appease the labor dissatisfaction and increase the prestige of the 
profession, make it more competitive and attractive for young workers as a viable career option at 
least to some extent, introduced a new wage-setting system, called a statutory payment (Etatinis 
apmokėjimas) to the trade unions during the collective bargaining process as a fairer and more 
equitable solution for wage determination for teachers (LŠDPS). Although this proposal does not 
concern pre-school or higher education workers, new wage setting method had to broaden the 
conception of teachers’ work including work outside contact hours from teaching in class (SMM, 
2018). Moreover, in the first version of the collective agreement that was signed in 2017-11-06, 
the government pledged that over the course of 2018-2019 it will appoint additional 93 mln. EUR 
to incrementally increase the wages for education workers (LPSK, 2017).  
Although the collective agreement was signed by 6 education trade union confederations that 
collectively unite approximately 12,000 education workers, one other key trade union — LŠDPS, 
which accounts for around 5,000 unionized education workers, decided not to put its signature on 
the document (See Table 5). According to the chairman of LŠDPS Andrius Navickas, the whole 
full-time payment model has not been discussed enough and in proper depth. It was still unknown 
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exactly how and to whom the wage increases were going to bring the most significant, if any effect. 
Despite the absence of LŠDPS, collective agreement was still concluded as it met the legal labor 
code requirements for the number of representative parties that are required to conclude the 
sectoral collective agreement (Labor Code of Lithuania, 186-202)  
Table 6. Source: 2017-11-22 collective agreement and trade union survey. 
Collective agreement (not incl. 
Amendments) 
Key trade union 
confederations in the 
collective bargaining 
process  
Total estimation of trade union 
members/Membership of 
signatory trade unions 
2017-11-22 (valid until a 
termination or a new agreement 
is signed) 
1.  LŠPSP * 
2. LŠĮPSP * 
3. LMPSP * 
4. Solidarumas 
5. LAMPSS 
6. Sandrauga  
7. LŠDPS (non-signatory 
trade union)  
 
 
18,000/13,000 
*LŠPSP, LŠĮPSP, LMPSP in May, 2019 merged into one separate trade union confederation – LŠMPS. 
 
Fast forward to November 2018, after a few months of implementation of the new full-time 
payment system education community was frustrated by its effects in practice. While to some 
teachers’ wages increased, to others they shrank (Jurkevičius, 2018; Laučius, 2018). Even if there 
was a noticeable discontent with the new system largely across the whole sector, signatory trade 
unions from the collective agreement were entrapped legally and could not initiate corresponding 
action, such as a strike, as de jure government actions met its broad obligations in the agreement. 
However, LŠDPS — a non-signatory trade union without avail with threats to start a strike 
to initiate a dialogue with the Ministry of Education and Sports and to amend the new method for 
wage determination on 12 November, 2018 went on a strike (LŠDPS, 2018). Its main demands for 
the amendment of the new wage-setting method were to increase fixed salary coefficient for 
teachers by 20 %, set the ceiling for in class contact hours number to a maximum of 18 hours/week 
and lower the number of students in classes.  
The strike was spreading with each day and over a course of a month was joined, according to 
different sources, by around 200 - 400 teachers. With the increasingly mounting political pressure, 
on 28 November, LŠDPS trade union representatives, were invited to the Ministry of Education 
and Sports to renegotiate the terms of and conditions for the potential upgrade for the new wage-
setting system (Želnienė, 2018). However, after unsuccessful attempts to reach a compromise 
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during that day, teachers decided to stay in the premises as long as it takes to reach an agreement 
and occupied the Ministry building for the rest of 3 weeks. This particular action ignited massive 
public attention to the issue, was at the center of the media and resulted in the Minister of Education 
and Sports resignation on 4 December, 2018 (Jablonskaitė, 2018). 
Between the beginning of teachers’ stay in the Ministry and Minister’s resignation, other trade 
unions joined the re-negotiation process likewise. Interestingly, most of their representatives were 
much more lenient to the proposed solutions by the Ministry and argued that the state budget for 
the next year is already formed which leaves not enough space for maneuver for additional 
concessions (Laisvės TV, 2018). It created a certain fragmentation between LŠDPS and largely all 
other trade unions as they shared significantly different visions for the changes and and their 
execution timeline in education system. A more lenient negotiation stance of other trade unions, 
can in part be explained with their closer ties with the government’s ruling party, as some of the 
administrative staff from LŠMPS (LŠĮPSP, LŠPSP, LMPSP merged into one trade union) belong 
to the ruling party and work as advisors to some members of the national parliament (Bručkienė, 
2019). Naturally, LŠMPS may had been incentivized more to resolve the conflict on peaceful terms 
without putting government’s legitimacy into jeopardy. 
However, a newly assigned temporary Minister of Education agreed with the LŠDPS on some 
wage-setting system amendments and formed a work group to further fix the obscurity of the 
system. During the summer of 2019, the government and four trade unions (LAAMPS, LŠMPS, 
Solidarumas and Sandrauga) agreed on additional financing of 117,6 mln. EUR on wage increases 
for teachers, pre-school teachers and higher education workers starting next year (LŠMPS, 2019; 
Elta, 2019). However, fast forward to Autumn, in the preliminary state budget plan only additional 
55,5 mln. EUR were assigned to the education. Accordingly, trade unions announced a warning 
strike scheduled on 28 November as the government violated the terms and conditions of the 
agreement. After the strike, government agreed to find additional 50 mln. Eur and follow its 
obligations (LRV, 2019). 
Interestingly, it was agreed that the wage increase by 10% for teachers, and higher education 
workers was scheduled only from September 2020. Which means that the total yearly wage 
increase was determined to be only 3% which is barely higher than usual yearly inflation rate. 
Along these lines, LŠDPS once again refused to be a signatory party and criticized the amendment 
of the collective agreement as being too lenient to the previously stated demands and experienced 
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struggle (LŠDPS, 2019). In addition, pressuring dissatisfaction with the achieved outcomes was 
expressed by many not unionized higher education workers and researchers. Claiming that the 
representative trade union for higher education – LAAMPS did not sufficiently represented the 
interests of the whole professional community, mostly not unionized higher education community 
organized a picket called The Last Priority, upon which the largest Lithuania’s Universities where 
giving out diplomas for free, however, without avail to impact any changes.  
Although there were significant wage increases for preschool teachers and the full-time 
payment methodology underwent particular corrections, government’s pledge to incrementally 
increase wages for teachers and higher education workers until their average wages reaches 1.3 
country’s average in 2025 is yet to be materialized. Concerning is the fact, that agreements with 
the current government may be pushed aside and ignored after 2020 parliamentary elections in an 
instance of other political parties forming a new ruling coalition. 
 
6.2 Case Study: Healthcare 
Financing for healthcare in Lithuania has been below that of countries with similar economic 
development (OECD, 2018). Furthermore, similarly to education, healthcare system is 
significantly affected by changing demographics and urbanization. Although the average number 
of medical staff for the whole population has been systematically increasing, one needs to consider 
considerably aging population and the growing need for medical services (See Appendix, Table 
7). It is evident from the demand of healthcare workers in the labor market which over the last 
decade considerably increased (See Table 8). Moreover, due to relatively available exit option to 
other EU countries where employment conditions are more competitive and considerably large 
country’s private healthcare sector which features slightly higher average wages, labor market is 
in constant competition for healthcare workforce. Accordingly, there are significant structural 
incentives if not to ensure superior employment conditions in public healthcare, at least to keep up 
with the competition from the private sector. 
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Table 8. Labor market demand for healthcare workers and total labor force of healthcare and 
social work workers in private and public sector. Source: osp.stat.gov.lt 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Job Vacancies 
(Q4) 
1125 513 508 506 540 786 566 820 1160 1339 1321 
Labor force in 
public sector 
74,000 
Labor force in 
private sector 
20,300 
 
On top of that, demand for medical services in less populated regional areas is too low for 
hospitals to operate in a financially sustainable and effective manner which results in drastic 
disparities in wage levels for medical personnel between different healthcare institutions. 
Insufficient wages also cause healthcare workers to work in multiple locations exceeding full-time 
working limits (15 Min, 2018). Moreover, there is a persisting problem of underpaid resident 
doctor staff which provides low incentives for young professionals to integrate into Lithuania’s 
healthcare labor force as residents after their graduate studies (Saukienė, 2016).  
 Although without particular strike actions, healthcare workers grievances from insufficiently 
financed and optimized public healthcare system are evident from various vocal pickets or protests. 
Lack of strike occurrence within healthcare sector can in part be explained with stricter legal 
constraints for industrial action. According to the Labor Code of Lithuania (2016, 234-260), 
healthcare workers are considered to be essential workers, therefore, the warning of an upcoming 
strike has to be announced 5 working days sooner than it is to most of the other workers. In 
addition, even with an approval to start a strike, medical workers have to ensure the provision of 
minimal health services. Naturally, the potential to significantly disrupt the production process is 
lower which provides lower incentives to start a strike in the first place.  
It would be reasonable to consider the 2017-06-16 collective agreement as a starting reference 
point to the whole bargaining process that tried to address the persistent healthcare system issues 
and workers’ demands. The collective agreement was signed between 5 trade unions that unite 
approximately 23,000 healthcare workers and Ministry of Healthcare. Although initially it had no 
substantive improvements in employment conditions as its purpose was more to maintain status 
quo in accordance to soon to be enforced new labor code which is less favorable for healthcare 
workers, over the course of one year it had some significant amendments (JGA, 2017; Also see 
Table 8). 
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Table 9. 
Collective agreement (not incl. 
Amendments) 
Key trade union 
confederations in the 
collective bargaining process  
Total estimation of trade union 
members/Membership of 
signatory trade unions in the 
second collective agreement 
1. 2017-06-16 (valid until 
2018-12-31) 
2. 2019-01-01 (valid until 
2021-12-31) 
1. LGS 
2. LFDPS 
3. LSSO 
4. LSADPS 
5. Solidarumas* 
6. LMS (not a trade union) 
 
 
23,000/21,000 
*Signatory trade union only in the 2017-06-16 collective agreement.   
 
Later in the year trade unions and one key association for healthcare workers — LMS (Medics 
of Lithuania) with the Ministry of Healthcare representatives began to work on the wage increase 
question. Although initially there was a proposal for a wage increase by 15 % starting from July, 
2018, LMS took a tougher stance and demanded a 30% increase starting from January, 2019. The 
expressed proposal did not gather much support from the largest healthcare trade union 
confederation LGS, but was backed by LSADPS which mediated the divergent positions among 
the LMS and LGS (Lprofsajungos, 2017). According to the LMS leader Vytataus Kasiulevičius, 
the LGS did not see LMS as a sufficiently representative and competent organization to properly 
participate in the decision making as LMS was just a newly established and inexperienced 
organization, not even a trade union (Kasiulevičius, 2017). However, in the end trade unions and 
Ministry of Health managed to find a consensus and as a result agreed on wage increase by 20% 
starting from May, 2018. On top of that, the government committed to increase the wages for 
nurses and doctors until they reach 1,5 and 3,0 country’s average wage respectively in the second 
half of 2020. Government indeed put significant effort to follow its promises and in 2019 appointed 
additional 41,5 mln. EUR for wage increases by another 15 % (SAM, 2019).  
However, the beginning of 2018 started with a protest against unacceptable wage levels for 
resident doctor staff. Young professionals from healthcare, backed by LMS and supported by other 
trade unions, organized a protest march starting in Vilnius Airport called The Last March of Medics 
to The Airport in order to highlight the increasing emigration of resident doctor staff to foreign 
countries and generally persisting problems in healthcare (Petkevičė & Plikūnė, 2018; Alkas, 
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2018). Although since the beginning of a new year their wages increased by 12 %, the amount did 
not appear as sufficient. LMS also initiated a petition to more rapidly improve the healthcare 
system by increasing wages and improving other employment conditions that gathered 42,000 
signatures of medical workers and patients.  After their march to the central government building 
they’ve discussed their grievances with both Prime Minister and Minister of Health. Opposing 
sides have found some common grounds and the government pledged to undertake certain actions 
to fix the issues. After one year, resident doctor scholarships and wages were merged which 
equalized the income between those residents who pay tuition fees and those who do not. In 
addition, government appointed additional one-time stipends for every resident for as much as 227 
EUR. Moreover, since 1 of January 2019, junior and senior resident doctor wage coefficients 
increased from 3,5 to 7,6 and 4,0 to 8,1 respectively (Kasnikovskytė, 2019).  
Later in the year 2018, LMS organized another picket to remind the government about its 
obligations and highlighted other problematic areas in public healthcare employment conditions. 
It would be too bold to state that this particular event had caused a direct effect to later 
improvements of employment conditions, but once again the picket kept the topic lively which did 
not reduce the political pressure to the government (Juškytė, 2018).  
 4 of May, 2018 marks another stage in wage increase bargaining as trade unions and the 
Ministry of Health agreed on a relatively detailed appendix of the collective agreement which 
defines the wage structure for healthcare workers in different medical fields. In addition, the 
agreement sets the minimum wage floor requirements to inhibit the wage disparity between 
different hospitals (SAM, 2018). 
As a final nail to the collective bargaining process we could consider a new collective 
agreement that was signed in 31 of August, 2018. The agreement constitutes higher personal 
responsibility for medical workers for their committed errors in the workplace. Accordingly, 
Solidarumas did not see the content of the agreement as satisfactory and refused to its signature on 
it, while LMS supported Solidarumas position. Notwithstanding this drawback, the agreement also 
had particular benefits to workers, such as additional vacation days for signatory union members, 
supplementary payments for deviations from regular working conditions and additional funds for 
personnel training that thus were accepted as sufficient improvements by all of the other trade 
union confederations that unite 21,000 members. Also, other key previously signed arrangements 
such as wage floor stayed legally binding (SAM, 2018).  
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6.3 Comparison 
Both of the analysed sub-sectors feature similar patterns in grievances. However, as seen from the 
average increase in wages and other improvements in employment conditions, healthcare labor 
movement fared relatively better than education trade unions. PRT allowed to put important 
elements for trade union power estimation together which helped to unleash the differences of 
trade union capacity to influence the collective bargaining process. 
To begin with, key healthcare trade union confederations featured considerably higher 
membership numbers in nominal terms compared to education trade unions. The relative 
difference is even greater, because education sub-sector is around 1/3 larger than healthcare sub-
sector in terms of total labor force (See Table 9). In addition, the second largest trade union in 
education LŠDPS which unites around 5,000 education workers, lowered the overall organized 
labor associational capacity potential as it could not establish common grounds with other trade 
union confederations, thus limiting the overall leverage of education workers representatives in 
the negotiations.  
 
Table 10. Sources: osp.stat.gov.lt, Viešojo sektoriaus tendencijos (2019), trade union surveys. 
Sub-sector Overall membership of key 
trade union confederations 
Total labor force (public 
sector) 
Healthcare 23,000 74,000  
Education 17,000 124,900 
 
Interestingly, even having more developed associational power resources, healthcare organized 
labor did not materialize them into corresponding strategy, that is strike threats. An important 
intervening variable – legal basis for industrial action considerably lowers its potential 
effectiveness in an instance of this strategy employment. Even if, for example, LMS wanted to 
initiate a strike action – it could not legally to do so, because it was not a trade union. Meanwhile, 
even though having considerably more favorable basis to act, but more obscure associational 
power resources, employment of a strike threat strategy resulted in insignificant outcomes to 
education organized labor.  
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 Regarding the structural power resources, healthcare sub-sector once again had a relative 
advantage. Higher labor market demand, relatively easily attainable exit option and significantly 
larger private sector provide more leverage to bargain for benefits in working conditions to public 
sector healthcare compared to education trade unions. The strategic use and effectiveness of this 
particular power resource is evident from the narrative healthcare workers pushed during their 
pickets demanding higher increase in wages for resident doctor staff and improvements in 
healthcare generally. The strategic effectiveness of this power resource is evident from the 
corresponding outcomes to organized labor’s action. Contrary, featuring considerably lower 
structural power resources, a picket initiated by higher education workers was largely ignored by 
political officials. 
Table 11. Sources: osp.stat.gov.lt, Viešojo sektoriaus tendencijos (2019) 
Sub-sector Job vacancies as of 2018 Public/private labor force 
Healthcare 1321 74,000/20,300 
Education 356 124,900/10,400 
 
Lastly, the organizational power resources and their strategic use are ambiguous in both sub-
sectors. While historically and more recently education trade unions are the most familiar with the 
strategic use of this power resource, they lack consistency in the coordination of action. During 
the collective bargaining process there was a sense of animosity and competition, particularly 
between the two largest trade union confederations — LŠDPS and LŠMPS. While in 2015-2016 
all of the key trade unions were unified in strike action to initiate the bargaining process to address 
the key sectoral issues that materialized in new wage-setting method proposal by the Ministry of 
Education and Sports, later on, the visions diverged and there was a constant opposition between 
the trade unions themselves. Inner division between education trade unions is only useful for the 
opposing party in the bargaining process as it can manipulate trade unions to take a more obscure 
deal more easily, which, as observed from the case, can result in institutional setbacks to 
correspond with the according action when the agreement does not bring the expected outcomes. 
Although taking the deal might be better than nothing at all, potential pay-out would be 
undoubtedly higher if labor movement was able to catalyze its adversarial strategy through more 
developed organizational power resources maintaining robust unity and coordination of actions. 
Meanwhile, in healthcare sub-sector, even though LGS and LMS had some episodes of 
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confrontation and division, the crystallization of more common positions was mediated by other 
trade unions. In addition, trade unions were more supportive to each as other as it is evident from 
more unified trade union participation in the organized pickets. Even though the relatively higher 
organizational capacity did not materialize into strike action partly due to less favorable legal basis 
to disrupt the production process and other constraints, it helped to maintain a more consolidated 
position of labor movement in general that supplemented its structural power resources strategy to 
obtain more significant outcomes.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
The main purpose of this research was to untangle rather unlikely instance of positive 
developments in Lithuania’s public sector IR that stand in tension with the logic of leading CEE 
political economy and IR approaches. As explored under the closer scrutiny, public sector IR are 
considerably incongruent with the widely accepted national level categorizations of CEE political 
economy and IR regimes. Although it is true that the more market oriented the capitalist approach 
within the state, the more undermined private sector’s organized labor, the same dynamics, in 
owing to their higher degree of protection from market pressures, less elastic labor market and 
structural peculiarities of the employment, do not translate to the public sector IR as much. 
However, although similarly conditioned by more favorable external conditions upon which 
public sector organized labor capacity is embedded, some labor movements still manage to utilize 
them more than others, as it is evident from the disparity in outcomes from industrial activity 
between the education and healthcare sub-sectors.  
Accordingly, as external conditions rather explain the general preeminence of public sector IR 
over the private sector, research further focused on trade union capacity that stem from their 
internal power resources. Drawing from the occurring patterns of trade union capacity in the rest 
of the CEE during the post global financial period in accordance to the PRT, I hypothesized that, 
having more developed adversarial power resources, healthcare organized labor managed to apply 
corresponding strategies more effectively than education labor movement that resulted in more 
benefiting outcomes to workers. 
According to the defined three dimensions of adversarial strategy power resources, healthcare 
organized labor featured superiority in all of them. However, due to intervening legal constraints, 
the potential effectiveness in use of the strategies that stem from associational and organizational 
power resources was much more limited. Nonetheless, acknowledging its relatively more 
competitive position in the labor market, either domestically or transnationally, healthcare labor 
organized effective pickets and protests that had a direct effect to more benefiting outcomes to 
workers. In addition, more developed organizational power resources helped during the bargaining 
process to maintain a more unified, thus more leveraged stance against the opposing bargaining 
party – Ministry of Health. 
Meanwhile, the effectiveness of strategic employment of associational and structural power 
resources in education sub-sector was undermined by significantly disrupted organizational 
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capacity of trade unions to find common grounds and coordinate the action in a cohesive manner. 
Significant fragmentation among the education sub-sector organized labor did not allow to unleash 
its full associational, structural and organizational power potential and resulted into more lenient 
adjustment to government’s proposals and less substantive outcomes to workers. 
The research has implications for both CEE and Lithuania’s IR. While the external capacity of 
private sector organized labor in the neoliberal backdrop is nearing the endgame and is in dire 
straits, public sector labor movements still have a drop of hope. Research also confirmed the 
general pattern and observation made by Bernaciak (2011) that trade union strategies in CEE began 
to mainly rely on: “their position as veto players within the system.” In accordance to the results 
from the analysis, the capacity of organized labor to succeed in applying adversarial strategies 
significantly depends on the ability of different trade unions to act in a coordinated and cohesive 
manner.  
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Appendix:  
Table 6. Alterations in public healthcare labor force to overall population and aging population. 
Source: osp.stat.gov.lt 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Number of Nurses for 10,000 
Residents 
71.4 72.3 68.4 75.8 76.3 75.9 76.3 76.9 77.3 77.6 78.12 
Number of Doctors for 
10,000 Residents 
42.1 42.1 43.3 44.4 45.6 46.1 46.2 46.7 48.0 48.9 49.9 
Median age of the entire 
population 
39 39 40 41 41 42 42 42 43 43 43 
 
 
 
